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1. Introduction
The concept of activation covers a wide range of employment measures with very different approaches and emphases that are determined by the cultural and political traditions of each country, or even of the various regions within a country (Barbier 2000; Lodemel and Trickey 2001). However, despite the existence of these socially determined differences, all the measures have in common the fact that they are based on a new definition of the relationship between rights and responsibilities, in other words a new social contract. They all share the principle that the main responsibility for dealing with unemployment lies with the individual. In this context, responsibility is not simply taken to mean that the causes of unemployment are individual (that is, blame), but also in terms of making the individual responsible for implementing strategies to find work. What this amounts to is a redefinition of the established relationship between individual and society. The institutionalisation of social welfare through the welfare state was based on an understanding of unemployment as a threat to society, and it was therefore assumed that it was society’s duty to tackle this threat. It should be pointed out that one of the cornerstones of the prevailing model of social welfare and production in our society at the time was the principle of advance planning and regulation. Risk was seen as a burden which needed to be tackled through institutionally provided means. However, in contrast to this principle of society being responsible for dealing with risk, what we are seeing today is that the individual is increasingly being expected to undertake risk management. Risk is no longer seen as something negative but as something which is inevitable or even positive and necessary for economic growth and individual well-being. This change in the way in which risk is portrayed has come about as the discourse of the knowledge-based society has gained currency. According to this discourse we are witnessing the emergence of a new model of production which requires new principles for social and economic intervention. The European Union, particularly in its European Employment Strategy, has been especially active in promoting and spreading the knowledge-based society discourse and the need to review the social contract. Young people are one of the main targets of activation-based measures, largely because it is easier to make them accept what other groups might consider to be a rather questionable form of intervention in view of its coercive and paternalistic nature. Lodemel and Trickey (2001) show how this could be seen as an extension of the principle of institutionalised compulsory education for young people, something which is no longer questioned. Other issues that should be mentioned are the lower social value placed on young people’s work, the lower expectations of young people (which means that they are likelier to accept jobs with poorer conditions), and the potential danger of their work ethic suffering.
The first part of this paper will consider the nature and extent of European Union regulation in this field, and will attempt to demonstrate the significance of the role played by the EU’s institutions as promoters of ideological socialisation. Whilst it is true that the European Union did not invent the activation-based discourse, it has nevertheless played a major role in its propagation and in establishing the terms in which the problem of unemployment is discussed. The second section will examine the way in which the model of production is changing and how this has led to a need for new terminology that enables us to understand the ‘social question’. Finally, we will analyse the discourse of the EU’s institutions, particularly in respect of the European Employment Strategy, with a view to establishing the basis of the EU’s discourse with regard to activation.
2. The EU employment strategy: coordination of national policies for combating unemployment
At the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, the EU’s member states agreed to coordinate national policies for combating unemployment at European level. Whilst this strategy was aimed at all unemployed people, particular emphasis was placed on certain groups, such as the long-term unemployed, young people, and women.
The Luxembourg process probably constitutes one of the most credible attempts so far to create a social Europe. Its aim is to establish mechanisms for coordinating employment policy at European level. Thus, employment policy is being used to take the first steps towards complementing economic convergence with social convergence, although control of employment policy will remain in the hands of national governments. Rather than meaning the division of responsibilities between the national and the European level or the harmonisation of legislation in the different member states, what this amounts to is the establishment of dual-level cooperation and coordination with regard to employment policy (Goetschy and Pochet 1997). The idea is to create an open and flexible means of coordination between different levels aimed at solving common problems (Pochet 2001). This open form of coordination allows for a type of regulation which falls somewhere between more legislation-based regulation, which is considered to be inappropriately inflexible, and more flexible forms of ‘soft regulation’ (official recommendations, exchange of information, best practice, and national experience, development of structural indicators, joint information). Hence, it is designed to increase the legitimacy of European-level actions whilst still respecting both the huge diversity of labour markets in the member states and the national regulatory systems (Goetschy 1999). 
The EU’s employment strategy thus combines a methodology (aimed at driving policy in a common direction) with a number of quantified goals, and can be described as a process of creating regulations by consensus (Salais 2001) that comprises several stages. First of all, the EU establishes a set of guidelines (common targets for combating unemployment) based on a joint analysis of the situation in the different member states and of the main policy issues that need to be addressed in order to reduce unemployment. Comparative indicators are then developed in order to evaluate the results achieved in each country. Thereafter, the member states have to draw up an annual National Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of the employment guidelines. The transposition of the guidelines into quantified national targets should respect the principle of subsidiarity and be in keeping with the broad principles of national economic policy. The NAPs are reviewed by the European Union (in accordance with the principle of multilateral supervision) and also using the peer review method, and an evaluation report is drawn up (‘joint employment report’) which makes a series of recommendations. 
This process has been consolidated as it has developed. Thus, at the recent summits in Lisbon and Nice, particular attention was paid to the creation of statistically comparable joint indicators in order to enable more effective evaluation of employment policies and to allow best practice to be identified. It appears that the trend is towards an inductive form of regulation based on principles such as coordination and awareness-raising (promoting exchange of information, communication, conferences) rather than more legislative forms of regulation such as directives.
Brief evaluation of the open method of coordinating the EU Employment Strategy (EES)
A number of criticisms have been levelled at the Luxembourg process, questioning the real impact of the EU’s strategy and whether it is actually possible to talk of an EU strategy for combating unemployment at all. First, the weak regulatory content and modest scope of the strategy have been criticised. Unlike in the case of EMU (economic and monetary union), the EES is based on guidelines and recommendations, and no specific penalties are available if these guidelines are not followed. Consequently, the employment strategy is in no way comparable to the verifiable and very clearly defined criteria for economic convergence, where sanctions were in place for countries that failed to meet the criteria. This means that in most cases the NAPs amount to little more than a continuation of existing policy, with the production of the action plans simply being an exercise in dressing up existing practices as part of a European strategy. Furthermore, most of the NAPs fail to adopt an integrated approach and do not clearly specify concrete targets, the resources available for implementation, or the indicators to be used for evaluation.
Another criticism of the EU’s employment strategy is that only limited financial resources are available for it. Indeed, the process was only accepted by the member states on condition that no additional financial resources would be required, in circumstances in which some countries are seeking to reduce the level of their contributions to the EU’s budget (Goetschy 1999; Keller 2000). The only EU funding available is through the structural funds; however, these are also aimed at regional economic projects designed to promote convergence in terms of development across the EU. It could therefore be argued that the EES is not so much a European strategy as a strategy for coordinating national policies which is wholly dependent on the extent to which member states are prepared to cooperate (Keller 2000). A further problem is the vagueness and weakness of the concepts underpinning the strategy, for example, employability, flexibility, activation, and partnership, all of which are ambiguous terms which can be interpreted in various ways, making it easy for member states to simply continue their existing policies.
Despite these weaknesses, the EU’s strategy could still have a significant impact at national level. The vagueness of many of the concepts employed does not necessarily have to constitute a weak point; indeed, it could be construed as a strength, since it makes it easier to adapt the strategy to different national labour markets.
Furthermore, although there are no official penalties for failing to implement the strategy, peer pressure may yet ensure a high degree of compliance: whilst the guidelines may not be legally enforceable, the symbolic importance of meeting them is nevertheless considerable. Poor results on the basis of the structural indicators established by the EU are likely to provoke considerable political debate domestically (Pochet 2001).
Indeed, the mere act of reclassifying existing policies into the categories established by the new employment guidelines has had a major symbolic impact. There can be little doubt that the socio-cognitive influence of EU discourse is increasing and that national policy is adapting more and more to the framework and approach of the European Union (Barbier 2001).
This approach has had a far-reaching impact on the way in which the problem is described and has influenced the overall direction of the debate. For example, terms such as employability, activation, benchmarking, partnership, and mainstreaming are becoming more and more popular at national level. Although these concepts were not invented by the European Union, it has nevertheless made them into official terms and popularised them. The institutions of the EU play an important role in determining the direction of the debate on this issue and in proposing new ideas and measures. In other words, they have an important socialising role, especially when it comes to developing a way of describing and explaining the problem of certain groups’ exclusion from the labour market. This is certainly one of the conclusions that can be reached regarding the impact of the EU’s strategy on young people (Serrano 2000).
With its emphasis on identifying and exchanging ‘best practices’, the EU’s strategy seeks to make it possible to share diverse practices and to promote the concept of learning from each other (Pochet 2000), all of which strengthens the socialising role of the European Union’s institutions (Teague 2001). Indeed, it could be argued that more rigid forms of legislation-based regulation would be poorly suited to today’s rapidly changing world. The kind of regulation envisaged by the EES is more flexible and could also be a very important means of influencing the situation. To some extent, the EU is adopting a regulatory system which is similar to the one previously adopted by the OECD, where recommendations and identification of best practice also played a key role in the discourse at national level.
In the case of groups such as women and young people, this process has led to greater emphasis being placed on evaluation and has promoted awareness of the need to develop suitable indicators (Behning and Serrano 2001). This in turn has meant better information, and a better understanding and greater awareness of the problem. In this respect, the process has had a significant impact at national level in terms of raising awareness of the situation of certain groups in the labour market.
The European Union is therefore promoting a new way of understanding the ‘social question’ in line with the prevailing model of production. The next section will look at the links between the prevailing model of production and ways of regulating the ‘social question’.
3. Model of production and social welfare
The European Union is playing a major part in defining both the terms of the debate surrounding the social question and the explanations that are coming to be accepted regarding the causes of unemployment. The EU’s institutions have made activation the cornerstone of their social welfare model. The reasons put forward for this approach are changes in the number and make-up of the unemployed, the rise in the number of people claiming benefit, and the associated rise in public spending. These changes have brought about a debate concerning the viability of a welfare state which has witnessed a transformation in the industrialised society model of production which was the very reason for its creation in the first place. In this section it will be argued that the EU model of activation-based intervention is a consequence not only of the problems with funding the social security system but also of new production requirements (being prepared to change jobs frequently, dynamism, initiative, autonomy). These are things which the EU presents as a fait accompli, arguing that modern society has changed over to a new model of production characterised by the metaphor of the knowledge-based society. It is not our intention to discuss whether or not this assertion is justified, but rather to examine the way in which the knowledge-based society requires a new ideology which has found concrete expression in the shape of the discourse regarding activation. Thus, the changes in the model of production are affecting the established, institutionalised relationship between employment and citizenship, altering the balance between social rights and individual responsibilities, and thereby contributing to a reassessment of the regulatory and legal basis of the welfare state.
Labour regulation in industrialised societies
Stability is the fundamental principle on which industrialised societies have traditionally been based. In order to achieve this stability it was necessary to eliminate uncertainty by means of strict labour regulation, removing risks and controlling future events. Economic and social stability were key requirements for this model of production. In organisational terms, the model was based on the strict division of labour (specialisation), keeping the manufacture of a product separate from its design, and a rigid structuring of the tasks performed at work. Centralised and hierarchical organisations met the market’s requirement for the mass production of identical goods. Economic and social stability were fundamental requirements of this model of mass production.
Social stability was achieved via the institutionalisation of the welfare state and of industrial relations. The institutionalisation of industrial relations allowed disputes to be predicted, planned for and regulated, all of which had a positive effect on companies’ profitability. Whilst the market does play an important regulatory role, it also has a number of weaknesses. The market alone does not guarantee stability and productivity, which is why social regulation of the market was necessary. This in turn is why state intervention was needed in order to ensure that certain areas were not regulated solely in accordance with the principles of financial profit. In this way, the welfare state constituted a way of protecting against risk. The institutionalisation of social welfare in the shape of the welfare state was further encouraged by the fact that unemployment came to be seen as a risk. The extent of unemployment meant that the liberal ideas that had prevailed previously, according to which poverty and joblessness were the responsibility of the individual, were no longer sustainable. Recognition of the intrinsic inequality of human beings led to a series of contractual guarantees being officially codified for employees. This, together with the statistical approach which was starting to be employed in order to measure unemployment and poverty more accurately (that is, on the basis of their causes, with a distinction being drawn between voluntary and involuntary unemployment) led to the problem being seen in terms of risk rather than individual fault (Rosanvallon 1995; Vanthemsche 1994). The idea of the state guaranteeing security in the face of temporary risks was reinforced by modernist thinking which presented progress as an inescapable imperative and saw strength and the ability to predict the future as guaranteeing this progress. According to this view, if humankind’s ability to reason was used correctly, it would enable us to control our species’ destiny and free the individual from poverty, allowing us to overcome natural and social determinism (Touraine 1993). Work thus became the cornerstone of society’s future. This combination of factors allowed people to manage the uncertainty implicit in the condition of being an employee. The social contract established as a result of the above enabled a degree of redistribution of income among the people protected by social security and throughout the whole life of each individual (the spreading of risk across society).
In this model, the individual was generally portrayed as a member of a group, be it a kin group, a group of workers, or a national group. Social welfare was structured on the basis of these three groups: the family, the factory or company, and the nation. The prevailing intervention strategies were based on (contributory) social security systems and aid (benefits), and the unemployed were the beneficiaries of social welfare programmes targeted on specific groups. This sectoral welfare state model was based on centralised regulation (substantialist regulatory values) in the framework of a general and abstract (and hence universal) law (social rights). Social welfare was regarded as a right intrinsic to the condition of citizenship.
The transformation of the model of production and social welfare: labour regulation in the knowledge-based society
In contrast with the above, the basic principle that characterises the model of production that is currently emerging is risk or instability. It is considered impossible to regulate events before they happen and risk is seen as inevitable. This makes it necessary to promote flexibility, so that people are able to cope with uncertainty and adapt to rapid changes in production demands. In this model of production, the ability to cope with unforeseen and sudden changes is held to be a prerequisite of economic success. In order to achieve this, a different organisational model is often encouraged, based on a multiskilled workforce and the linking of production and design. Some organisations have horizontal structures which require more independent workers with greater individual responsibility and able to perform a much wider range of tasks in order to meet the more individualised requirements of the market.
This model of labour regulation is accompanied by the emergence of a model of social welfare regulation which sees insecurity as inevitable. Rather than protecting against risk, the welfare state concentrates on promoting risk management (workfare), thereby consolidating the laws of the market. Thus, the market becomes the only regulator, punishing anyone who fails to adapt to its absolute laws of technological development and competitiveness. This technological determinism and tendency to see change as inevitable evokes a number of Darwinist metaphors. Likewise, the abovementioned change in the role of the welfare state is justified by the portrayal of unemployment as something for which the individual is responsible. The individual is seen as being responsible for managing risk (for example, the loss of one’s job), and this risk is considered to be an inevitable fact of life.
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It is therefore important to analyse the types of policy to which this emerging model of production and social welfare is leading. It is the belief of the authors that the institutional discourse, particularly of those institutions that play an important regulatory role at supranational level (OECD, EU), is having a major ideological influence on the way in which the social welfare model is changing, with activation-based measures and employment policy being a case in point. The discourse of the European Union on the subject of activation, especially in the context of the Luxembourg process,​[3]​ is making a key contribution to the legitimisation of both the emerging model of production and, simultaneously, the development of a new ‘social contract’. We will now examine this process in more detail.
4. Activation in EU discourse: the characteristics of the social welfare model being proposed
Discourse is not merely a means of expressing decisions and actions that have already been taken: it too is an action which can have a number of different functions. The main function of political discourse in general, and more specifically of the discourse regarding activation, is to justify and legitimise the decisions taken by institutions.
Political discourse is therefore a rhetorical action designed to justify to a target audience decisions that have been taken. It seeks to present these decisions as reasonable conclusions that have been arrived at on the basis of a definition of reality and a set of values that are allegedly shared by the target audience – for example, social welfare (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1988) – or in accordance with supposedly universally shared principles, such as the fight against dependency or unemployment. In this respect, the political discourse concerning activation actually constructs a definition of reality. As Fairclough (2000: 1) points out in relation to the language of the new capitalism, 
Language is an important part of the new order. First because imposing the new order centrally involves the reflexive process of imposing new representations of the world, new discourses; second because new ways of using language are an important part of the new order. So the project of the new order – a project because it is incomplete, and those who benefit from it are working to extend it – is partly a language project. Correspondingly, the struggle over the new order is partly a struggle over language.
The reality constructed by the EU discourse on activation both defines the social actors and their responsibilities (section A), and produces the individuals that it relates to (section B).
A. Defining the situation: the role of the social institutions
These authors would argue that the EU’s discourse regarding the current situation in Europe is profoundly contradictory. On the one hand, it is based on the need to adapt actively to the new economic order, and in this respect it considers national and European institutions to be responsible for managing this process of change (responsible for activating the economy, activating the workforce, and activating social welfare, see A.1). On the other hand, it also seeks to present change as something natural, adopting a fatalistic attitude according to which the situation is inevitable, which means that there is very little that the institutions can do about the tyrannical demands of new technologies (A.2).
A.1. Active adaptation: the European social model.
 The discourse on activation is a discourse about change and more specifically a discourse about the need for both the economy and individuals to be proactively involved in change. This active adaptation is declared to be a current need and something that is likely to continue to be necessary in the future. 
The rapid changes in information technology, communication and life sciences make it necessary for each Member State . . . to be at the cutting edge of the knowledge-based and innovatory economy and society, the wellspring today of growth and development. (European Council 2000b: 14)
To a great extent, adaptation consists in knowing how to make the most of the potential of both the EU’s citizens or workers and the information society itself: 
The rapid and accelerating pace of change means it is urgent for the Union to act now to harness the full benefits of the opportunities presented. (European Council 2000a: 1)
Preparing the transition to a knowledge-based economy, reaping the benefits of the information and communication technologies, modernising the European social model by investing in people and combating social exclusion and promoting equal opportunities are key challenges for the Luxembourg process. (European Commission 2001b: 8)
This active adaptation is based on what has come to be known as the European social model, something which is paradoxically understood as both a reality and a process: 
The Union must shape these changes in a manner consistent with its values and concepts of society . . . (European Council 2000a: 1)
[this model is] characterised in particular by systems that offer a high level of social protection, by the importance of social dialogue and by services of general interest covering activities vital for social cohesion, [this model] is today based, beyond the diversity of the Members States’ social systems, on a common core of values. (European Council 2000b: 14)
Given that it is a model (which is comparable to other models such as, perhaps, the ‘American way of life’), it is said to have a history, which ‘has developed over the last forty years’ (ibid.), despite the fact that the political and social map of Europe forty years ago bore little resemblance to the current one (half of Germany was under Communist rule, Portugal and Spain had fascist regimes, and Greece was an authoritarian monarchy). In this way, we can see how a view of Europe as a homogenous entity with a set of shared values has been constructed. Identifying these common values thus becomes a means of constructing a shared identity, as well as an argument justifying the need for a supranational organisation such as the European Union. The European model is something which does exist in its own right (vis-à-vis the American one), but it is also something that is being constructed (insofar as it is currently undergoing a transformation). It is therefore a model based on two different comparisons: a spatial comparison between the ‘European model’ and the American model, and a comparison in time between the current modernisation of the social model and the model of the past. 
Social policies are not simply an outcome of good economic performance and policies but are at the same time an input and a framework. In this context, the modernisation of the social model means developing and adapting it to take account of the rapidly changing economy and society, and to ensure the positive mutually supportive role of economic and social policies. (European Commission 2001a: 5) 
Having defined the situation as described above, the EU established a global strategic plan for itself at the Lisbon Summit, which was rather optimistic in tone: ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (European Council 2000a: 3). 
In order to enable the transition to this new knowledge-based economy, a number of social strategies and actions have been developed with the aim of finding solutions to specific problems such as the balance between supply and demand in the case of the new skills needed in the knowledge-based economy. ‘Europe’s advance into the Information society is a shared responsibility requiring rapid action’ (European Commission 2000: 29). It is here that the EU’s popular discourse on activation turns up with its three key elements: activating the economy, activating individual workers, and activating social welfare. The first element of this strategy of social intervention to create jobs is the activation of the economy. The institutions of the European Union have a key role in providing member states’ economies with access to new technologies, thereby ensuring economic and monetary stability and encouraging and promoting entrepreneurship. Secondly, the EU stresses the importance of activating potential workers by helping individuals to adapt their technical skills and psychological qualities to a new economic order characterised by constant change, fierce competition, and the requirement that workers should be always available and totally committed to their work. The final element of this discourse is the activation of social welfare, which penalises anybody who fails to contribute to the creation of economic wealth and encourages mobility between different social positions.
A.2. Passive adaptation: the discourse of inevitability. 
The basis of the EU’s discourse on activation is encapsulated in an assertion that is taken to be self-evident and indisputable: we are already living in a knowledge-based information society. The information society is defined as a global reality which therefore transcends the borders of the EU. ‘The European Union is confronted with a quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the challenges of a new knowledge-driven economy’ (European Council 2000a: 1).
The concept of the knowledge-based information society, which is a term coined by social scientists to refer to recent socio-economic changes, is thus converted into an indisputable fact which is presented in the absolute terms of an objective reality. This phenomenon of presenting a given situation as natural is an ideological process whereby social concepts and explanations are transformed, in this case via discourse, into facts of nature. The main function of this process is to prevent the definition of the situation that has been adopted from being questioned politically. After all, if something is considered to be natural, then it is indisputable, it cannot be questioned, or rather it would be pointless to question it. Nature is not something that you question; all you can do is try to understand it and adapt to it.
Consequently, the basis of this discourse is the very way in which it defines what a knowledge-based information society is: a reality that we have no choice but to accept, the main characteristics of which arise from technical processes that are both economic (the new global economy) and technological (the development of information and communications technologies [ICTs]). As explained above, this reality is presented as natural and hence it is seen to be as inevitable as any other fact of life, meaning that adaptation to it is all that can be done at a political level. In light of the above, it is only logical that the most sensible political approach is the one that makes the most of the new situation. Should any political conflict arise, it will always be of a technical rather than an ideological nature.
Another specific characteristic of the discourse on activation is that by invoking metaphors of both commitment and struggle it ends up being very vague. The concept of a struggle or a fight, which is so evident in the European Union’s discourse, simply serves to reinforce the metaphor of dynamism which underpins the activation model. The rhetoric of commitment appears in the use of various metaphors linked to effort and struggle: for example, the EU is committed to combating unemployment, exclusion, and other social problems. But as we have seen, this struggle is presented as a process of necessary adaptation to something which is inevitable. In effect, this is a passive process, and the EU’s discourse is a discourse of ‘passive activation’. Straehle et al. (1999) come to a similar conclusion after analysing the Presidency Conclusions of Jacques Santer and the speeches of Commissioner Flynn over a period of several years: They demonstrate that ‘a metaphor of struggle is repeatedly invoked in conjunction with (un)employment’ (ibid.: 71). In their analysis of the different uses of the metaphor of struggle, however, they point out that even when ‘struggle’ is employed to refer to the use of specific tools to overcome a particular problem or situation – that is, when it is used in a very concrete type of discourse – the structure of the discourse remains abstract: 
More important to note about the kinds of tools used in the struggle against unemployment is that while nouns like strategies and initiatives or verbs such as monitor, examine, and keep track of may appear to a reader or audience to be concrete political interventions, upon closer consideration it is clear that they are actually relatively abstract. ...although these activities seem like material processes [that is, concrete actions], they are, in fact, largely mental processes. (Straehle et al. 1999: 86)
In this, the authors see a paradox: ‘political measures against unemployment, despite being constructed in “active” terms [that is, the EU must take up the “fight” against unemployment], must be embedded in economic actions, which, in the sense of market regulation, are reduced to a minimum, that is, are largely “passive”’ (ibid.: 93). 
We have reached a similar conclusion. In our view, the basis of this passive form of activation is a discourse characterised by vagueness. This is an idea which was developed some years ago by the sociologist Uli Windisch to explain xenophobic discourses. In this type of discourse, the individual or player who has carried out or is responsible for an action is not precisely identified. The basic structure used by this discourse is the impersonal form, with impersonal words and phrases such as ‘one’, ‘they’, ‘it’, and ‘there are’ being preferred. In this type of discourse, the whole of society (‘them’ or ‘everyone’) is collectively responsible for the phenomenon in question. In the case studied here, the impersonal element is provided by the reference to an economic reality that is presented as being inevitable. 
The developing information society has the potential to transform Europe into a society and economy in which advanced technologies are used to improve the living and working conditions of all citizens. (European Commission 2000a: 3)
These changes are affecting every aspect of people’s lives and require a radical transformation of the European economy. (European Council 2000a: 1)
We could summarise the contradictory nature of the activation discourse in the following table.

Table 2: Contradictory nature of the activation discourse

	Active adaptation: European social model (adaptability)	Passive adaptation (Discourse of the unavoidable)
Role of the European institutions	Management of change towards knowledge-based society	To react vis-à-vis new productive paradigm
Type of discourse	Focus on dynamics metaphors (fight, combat, etc.) 	Abstract structureMental processes (monitor, exchange, examine)Impersonal forms 
Type of intervention	Activate: economy, workers, social protection	Reactive capacity
Social differences	Technical, digital and skills gaps	Individual attitudinal differences

B. Production of suitable individuals
Any system or method of production requires a certain kind of organisation and a certain kind of individual. The Fordist industrial production model required – or rather requires, insofar as it is by no means a model of production that has disappeared – a planned and centralised organisational structure and disciplined individuals. It is already many years since Michel Foucault correctly identified the close relationship between the modern age and discipline – discipline at work, in the penal system, and at a psychological level. 
The new methods of production and organising work, which Manuel Castells designates ‘the network society’, require new kinds of personal skill which go beyond mere technical know-how and discipline in the workplace to embrace every aspect of an individual’s life. It is no longer enough for people to have the appropriate knowledge, they must also have the appropriate attitudes and be flexible about when they are available for work, which really means that they must be permanently available.
The moral justification for these new demands on workers, which embrace their whole life, tends to be based on the same individualistic subjectivity which characterises labour policy. The emphasis placed on psychological factors, and in particular on personal availability, is especially important in this respect. There can be little doubt that this kind of moral discourse is limited in terms of both its scope and its effectiveness, amongst other things because it is completely irrelevant to many jobs. As Rose (1989) points out, many jobs simply require you to be prepared to accept the management’s authority and respond to financial incentives; in other words, all that is needed is the ability to react in an environment which is structured in terms of rewards and penalties. The situation is very similar in the case of activation-based employment policies.
Just as in the case described above, what we are really witnessing is a contradiction between the values of personal autonomy and the values of pragmatism. The discourse of personal autonomy is the discourse of personal commitment and responsibility. The individual required by this discourse is an analytical person who is able to weigh up which is the best alternative in a creative, interdependent relationship, a person who is basically internally or intrinsically motivated and who acts in accordance with his or her own convictions and commitments (B1). On the other hand, the individual required by a reactive discourse informed by the values of pragmatism is a behaviouristic person who thinks reactively and adaptively rather than in an analytical and symbolic manner. Such individuals choose the most gratifying (or least unpleasant) course of action; they are motivated by external factors and act because they are prompted to do so by their circumstances (B2).
Therefore the prevailing discourse on activation of the European Union is very ambiguous as to whether the individuals that it seeks to target are active individuals (internally motivated, see section B.1) or activated individuals (passively motivated, see B.2). Although the rhetoric of personal autonomy is employed, a number of lines of reasoning are also used which foster the creation of dependent individuals.
B.1 ‘Active individuals’. 
The information society defined above requires a certain type of individual to develop. The activation of individuals is understood as a process aiming to help them to adapt to the new economic order in the knowledge-based society. This adaptation is not purely technocratic, it is also moral.
The aim is to produce workers able to ‘guarantee supply’ by providing them with the skills and qualifications required by companies in the emerging sectors. In the case of young people, it is thought that by providing them with IT skills, for which an increase in demand is forecast in the next few years, they are being prepared for the future. 
Since the information society requires flexible workers with a task-oriented approach to work and with a range of qualifications, all workers should be trained in the field of the information society and have access to the Internet […] 
Technological development and the globalisation of economies have permanently changed the character of both work and employment . . . Employment has become on average less stable and less certain than in the past, and more dependent on high skills and adaptability. (European Commission 2000a: 13)
The rhetoric of adaptability and flexibility transforms the instability and uncertainty of the economy into a personal problem. Whereas adaptation is a process, adaptability is a quality and it is a term which is used in very different ways by different people. The discourse of the EU tends to use adaptability generically to refer to the adaptability of both businesses and workers. The obvious issue that arises from this is that what is merely an organisational problem for a business is a personal problem for a worker: workers are expected to have a certain attitude and to be permanently available, or as Gee et al. (1996) put it, they must be ‘eager to stay and ready to leave’.
This personal adaptability is described as employability (personal competencies which allow individuals to adapt to different situations): ‘[c]ombat long-term unemployment by developing active preventive and reintegration strategies based on early identification of individual needs and improving employability’ (European Council 2000b: 19).
The main tools of this employability are ‘life-long education and training, in particular in new technologies’, and its function is seen as enabling a supply-oriented social policy: ‘in order to avoid skills shortages’ (ibid.). ‘Improving basic skills, particularly IT and digital skills, is a top priority . . . This priority includes . . . overcoming the present shortfall in the recruitment of scientific and technical staff’. (European Council 2001: 3)
EU policy therefore aims to concentrate on guaranteeing a supply of skilled labour.​[4]​ The problem is clearly presented in terms of the supply of skilled workers rather than the demand for work. Given this approach, the institutions view their responsibility in terms of producing workers who are able to meet current business needs, that is, to meet the demand for flexible workers which in some cases they attribute to the requirements of the supposedly impersonal and natural phenomenon of the ‘knowledge-based society’, whilst in others it is explicitly identified as a requirement for ‘successful businesses’: 
It is necessary to guarantee the supply of specialist workers in the information society both in the short and the medium term, otherwise opportunities for job creation and growth will be wasted. Likewise, new forms of organising work such as teleworking increase productivity and improve quality of life in the information society. (ibid.)
Work in successful businesses is no longer the same as in the old industrial model, . . . instead it requires flexible and adaptable workers with a range of skills’. (ibid.)
In this way, for example, adaptability is linked to competitiveness and combating social exclusion, as if they were all part and parcel of the same thing: ‘[i]t is essential for skills to develop and evolve in order to improve adaptability and competitiveness and combat social exclusion’ (European Council 2000b: 14).
It is assumed that producing flexible individuals will make a positive contribution to the fight against social exclusion. The fight against exclusion, which is one of the explicit challenges that the EU has set itself, is based on the idea that participation in the labour market is the best way of combating exclusion:​[5]​ ‘[p]aid employment for women and men offers the best safeguard against poverty and social exclusion’ (European Council 2001: 7). 
In this way, the abstract discourse concerning adaptability is converted into an equally abstract but at the same time asymmetrical requirement for people to accept certain responsibilities. The risk of social exclusion, which is described exclusively as not participating in the labour market, is put down to a lack of training in the field of ICTs. Statistics are used to justify this analysis; obviously, they serve to back up the assertion that the poorer a person’s qualifications, the poorer their employment situation, the worse their job, and the more likely they are to be unemployed or to stop looking for work. By explaining social inequality in terms of personal qualities (training), it becomes possible to describe it as a ‘digital divide’ and to attribute ultimate responsibility for it to the individual, whilst also rather abstractly making the social partners partly responsible:
It is crucial to improve qualifications and increase the opportunities for lifelong education and training, giving an essential role to the social partners. (European Council 2001: 14)
However, the Employment in Europe 2001 report (European Commission 2001c) casts doubt on the theory that a lack of technical training is the only or the main reason for exclusion. 
When asked to assess their skills with respect to their current job, moreover, 58 per cent of all the employed in Europe declare that they have skills to do a more demanding job and thus seem either over-qualified for their job or ambitious to perform more demanding tasks. While this self-assessment is similar across men and women and younger and prime-age workers, full-time and part-time employed as well as workers on permanent and temporary contracts, it differs significantly by sector and educational background: 41 per cent in industry compared to 57 per cent in services and two-thirds of the high-skilled declare themselves as ‘over-qualified’ for their current job’. (European Commission 2001c: 73)
The problem comes when you try to deal with structural problems as if they were personal problems. The solution that is effectively being offered is one of individual social mobility, that is, one based on personal development, especially in terms of acquiring new skills. A variety of institutions can provide help with this personal development, although ultimately it is the individual who is responsible for it.
To improve job quality in Europe in a sustainable way, labour market policies and regulatory frameworks have to be designed to help people – in particular, the currently disadvantaged, trapped in low quality jobs – move up into jobs of better quality . . . Concerted efforts to promote qualifications . . . would be conducive to further improvements in the quality of jobs in Europe. (European Commission 2001c: 80)
No allowance is made for the potential existence of a fragmented labour market in the information society, or even, to some extent, polarisation: if somebody is in an unstable work situation it is down to their lack of skills. This discourse transforms a lack of jobs (or a lack of decent jobs) into a lack of personal skills (essentially training, but also attitudes and values).
Furthermore, this new age allegedly makes the main existing problems in the field of discrimination irrelevant:
Since a worker’s gender is irrelevant in the digital age, and limitations of space and time or because of disability are fewer, the information society will be a world in which everyone has greater access to work. (ibid.)
This leaves us wondering whether they think that gender was a relevant ‘limitation’ in the previous, non-digital era which therefore justified discrimination in terms of access to work. The discourse is consistent with this interpretation: policies promoting equal rights have become policies promoting technological development, and demands for personal dignity and recognition of diversity have been turned into a personal skills issue.
According to this purely economics-based understanding of social cohesion, social differences are reduced to mere technical differences on the one hand (such as whether an individual has access to and is able to use ICTs), and to ‘individual and moral’ differences on the other (for example the ability to deal with change, attitude to work, and so on). Hence, the social divide is transformed into a digital divide (ibid.) with unsurpassed rhetorical sleight of hand. The digital metaphor is widespread, ranging from its use in defining the information society to the description of social and labour relations within this information society, with the term ‘digital divide’ being employed to refer to the polarisation of the labour market between people who have been trained and educated to use ICTs and those who have not. The social divide between workers on short-term contracts with poor conditions and those with greater job stability is put down to people’s individual skills and their access (which is also presented as an individual issue) to basic information technology (computers and the Internet). Likewise, differences between the situations of individuals are attributed to the way in which each individual has managed his or her ‘employability’ and their skill in adapting to a changing world. According to these criteria, the socio-political analysis of the information society amounts to nothing more than a technical analysis of the best ways of matching supply to demand.
This individualised form of intervention rejects the approach of seeking to bring about the structural changes needed in order to resolve the more global political issues of which exclusion is a part. In other words, the overall context of the problem, in this case the socio-economic causes of unemployment, is ignored. By concentrating on measures designed to change individuals’ attitudes to work (job-seeking, training, etc), the issue is turned into an individual, psychological problem. Social differences can thus be presented as ‘personality’ differences, that is, differences in people’s ability and attitudes with regard to fitting into society and being prepared to adapt to the demands of work. Hence, this type of intervention involves transferring conflicts from the macro sociological level to the individual, personal level.
B.2. ‘Activated’ individuals: the modernisation of social security. 
The flexibility discussed above is not the flexibility of independent and analytical individuals who are able to take their own flexible decisions, rather it is flexibility understood as adaptability. What is being described is passive adaptation to a situation which is externally imposed, and which is coercive in nature: 
Workers in the digital age therefore need to be ICT literate, highly skilled and have a high degree of personal autonomy, and mobile and ready for continuous training (lifelong learning). (European Commission 2000:14)
It is interesting to note the rhetorical use of the term ‘the digital age’, implying that anyone who is reluctant to accept the new social policy model is in fact being reactionary and traditionalist. In other words, such people are reacting against the ‘new age’, and are rejecting new (digital) technologies in favour of tradition. Anyone who calls into question the new ways of subjugating and using force against workers is condemned, not as a revolutionary but as a reactionary.
Furthermore, the discourse of autonomy, mobility, and job quality is in contrast to the coercive instruments that have been established to increase the activity rate and to push people into work. In particular since the Lisbon summit, there has been a shift in the emphasis of the European Union’s social model towards putting economic factors before social ones. At the same time, the priority has changed from combating unemployment to increasing employment (Pochet 2001). Employment is thus presented as the solution to all our problems (Barbier 2001). The goal of increasing employment forms the basis of the activation measures aimed mainly at women, older people, young people, and those who are excluded from the labour market. This emphasis on increasing employment means that priority is being given to the quantitative aspects of the labour market crisis with less attention being paid to its qualitative aspects. In this respect, social welfare systems are designed ‘in order to make work pay’ (European Council 2000b: 23). 
Benefit, tax and training systems – where that proves necessary – must be reviewed and adapted to ensure that they actively support the employability of unemployed persons. Moreover, these systems should interact appropriately to encourage the return to the labour market of those inactive persons willing and able to take up a job. Particular attention should be given to promoting incentives for unemployed and inactive people to seek and take up work . . . (European Commission 2001b: 11).
The measures referred to above are designed to increase the incentives for people to look for work, and as such they imply major changes in the relationship between employment and citizenship. As the Presidency Conclusions of the Stockholm European Council state: ‘[w]ell designed and functioning welfare systems should be seen as productive factors by offering security in change’ (European Council 2001: 6). This idea, which was already present at the Nice summit, is considered to be a sign of progress and modernisation. The activation measures are used as a way of making the right to social welfare conditional, with those who do not wish to co-operate being subject to a system of penalties. The fact that there is now a set of compulsory conditions that determines whether one can have access to certain rights, with the threat of penalties for those who fail to meet these conditions, explains why it is appropriate to talk of the social contract underlying citizenship being rewritten. 




Table 3: Contradictory nature of the activation discourse

	Active individual	Activated individual
Norms and values	Ethic of personal autonomy: personal motivation, implication and responsibility (reflexive individual able to evaluate)	Instrumental ethic: external motivation, individual who is able to react and to adapt, who make choices between incentives and sanctions (sticks and carrots)
Discourse style	Rhetoric of adaptability and flexibility	Dependent subjects motivated by external gratifications
Role of the welfare state	To produce subjects adapted to new needs, with flexibility, mobility, and autonomy	Disciplined individuals
Social question	Fight against social exclusion by promoting personal adaptability (employability)	Fight against inactivity. Social protection is no longer a universal right 
Social inequalities	Based on individual competences (training, responsibility, and so on)	Based on moral competences (work ethic)

5. Conclusions
A study of the European Union’s discourse with regard to its social welfare model enables us to analyse the strong interconnections between the ideological demands of an economic model and the state, in its role of ensuring the economic model’s viability. The globalisation of trade and the mass integration of new technologies into production processes have led to the need for a new model of production and social welfare. In order for the new model of production to be viable, major changes in the principles that formed the basis of the social welfare model of industrialised societies are required. The EU’s institutions are playing a more and more important role in social welfare regulation (supranational regulation). They have developed a sophisticated discourse regarding activation, which has become the cornerstone of the European Union’s proposed social welfare model, in the face of what it describes as a changing economy.
The EU’s discourse concerning activation contains an inherent contradiction, which is a reflection of the fact that it is just so much political rhetoric. It seeks to promote individual autonomy and combat dependency, but does so by coercing people on benefit and workers, thereby restricting their autonomy and freedom to make individual choices. Furthermore, the concept of activation, which is presented as a metaphor encapsulating the attitude that people should adopt in the face of the current changes, contrasts with the way in which these changes are declared to be natural and inevitable in an attempt to justify the argument that it is necessary to adapt (passively) to the new model of production. Finally, activation measures are presented as a means of fighting social exclusion, whereas in fact they often increase social exclusion, particularly when their coercive nature and the poor quality of the choices on offer actually drive people towards exclusion. Nevertheless, the contradictory nature of this discourse might have to do with its two different levels. The first level comprises the economic dimension and operation of the productive model. The second level refers to a social dimension or a political response. Activation seeks to promote economic dynamism while at the same time it attempts to enhance passivity and political resignation. In other words, individuals do have a high degree of autonomy on how to adjust themselves to the changing rules of the game, but this autonomy will never enable them to seriously question these rules.
References
Ardenti, R., and P. Vrain (2001) ‘Organisation du travail dans les PMI: deux modèles s’opposent’, Problèmes économiques, 2700, 25–30.
Barbier J. C. (2000), ‘A propos des difficultés de traduction des catégories d’analyse des marchés du travail et des politiques de l’emploi en contexte comparatif européen’, Document de travail, no. 3, CEE (September), 30.
Barbier, J. C. (2001) ‘Europe sociale: l’emploi d’abord’, Centre d’Etudes de l’Emploi, 44.
Beaujolin, F. (1999) La gestion des compétences. Etudes des cas commentées, Paris: Nathan.
Behning, U., and A. Serrano (2001) Gender mainstreaming in the European employment strategy, Brussels: ETUI.
Brown, V. (2001) ‘Youth attitudes on family, work, and community service: implications for welfare reform’, in New Federalism: Issues and Options for States, The Urban Institute, Series A, No. A-47.  
Crespo, E., J. Bergere, J. R. Torregrosa, and J. L. Alvaro (1998) ‘Los significados del trabajo: un análisis lexicográfico y discursivo’,  Sociología del Trabajo, 33: 51–70.  
European Commission (2000) Job creation strategies in the information society, COM (2000) 48 final.
European Commission (2001a) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘Employment and social policies: a framework for investing in quality’, COM (2001) 313 final.
European Commission (2001b) Proposal for a Council Decision on Guidelines for Member States’ employment policies for the year 2002, COM (2001) 511 final.
European Commission (2001c) Employment in Europe 2001: Recent Trends and Prospects, Luxembourg.
European Council (2000a) Presidency Conclusions: Lisbon European Council, Brussels.
European Council (2000b) Presidency Conclusions: Nice European Council, Brussels.
European Council (2001) Presidency Conclusions: Stockholm European Council, Brussels.
Fairclough, N (2000) Language in the New Capitalism, http://www.uoc.es/humfil/nlc/CA-15egd.doc.
Gee, J. P., G. Hull and C. Lankshear (1996) The new work order: behind the language of the new capitalism, Boulder: Westview Press.
Goetschy, J. (1999) ’The European employment strategy: genesis and development’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 5 (2).
Goetschy, J., and P. Pochet (1997) ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam: a new approach to employment and social affairs?’, Transfer, 3 (3), 607–22.
Keller, B. (2000) ‘The new European employment policy, or, Is the glass half-full or half-empty?’, in R. Hoffman, O. Jacobi, B. Keller, and M. Weiss (eds), Transnational industrial relations in Europe, Düsseldorf: Hans Böckler Stiftung.
Lodemel, I., and H. Trickey (2001) An offer you can’t refuse. Workfare in international perspective, Bristol: The Policy Press.
Perelman, C., and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1988) Traité de l’argumentation, Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles.
Pochet, P. (2000) ‘Trois visions du futur européen’, Infose, no. 5.
Pochet, P. (2001) ‘Le nouvel agenda social européen 2001–2006’, Bilan social de l’Union européenne – 2000, document preparé à la demande de la CES et l’ISE.
Rosanvallon, P. (1995) La nouvelle question sociale. Repenser l´Etat de providence, Paris : Seuil.
Rose, M. (1989) ‘Attachment to work and social values’, in D. Gallie (ed.), Employment in Britain, Oxford: Blackwell.
Salais, R. (2001) ‘Filling the gap between macroeconomic policy and situated approaches to employment: a hidden agenda for Europe?’, in B. Strath and L. Margnusson (eds), From Werner Plan to the EMU. A European Political Economy in Historical Light.   
Serrano, A. (2000) Tackling youth unemployment in Europe, Brussels: ETUI.
Straehle, C., G. Weiss, R. Wodak, P. Muntigl and M. Sedlak (1999) ‘Struggle as metaphor in European Union discourses on unemployment’, Discourse and Society, no. 10-1, 67–100. 
Teague, P. (2001) ‘Deliberative governance and EU social policy’, paper presented at the conference ‘Pour une politique européenne des capacities: un cadre de travail entre les chercheurs et acteurs du dialogue sociale européen’, Brussels, 12–13 January.
Touraine, A. (1993) Crítica de la modernidad, Temas de Hoy, Ensayo.
Vanthemsche, G. (1994) La sécurité sociale : Les origines du système belge. Le présent face à son passé. Brussels : De Boeck Université.
Vendramin, P., and G. Valenduc (2000) L’avenir du travail dans la société de l’information. Enjeux individuels et collectives, Paris: L’Harmattan.




^1	  Lecturer and researcher at the Social Psychology Department of the Faculty of Sociology at Madrid’s Complutense University. E-mail: sosoc05@emducms1.sis.ucm.es
^2	  Researcher at the European Trade Union Institute, Brussels, and Associate Professor at the Social Psycology Department of Social Sciences Faculty, Madrid. E-mail: aserrano@etuc.org.
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^4	  In light of this emphasis on training as a tool for adapting people to the new economic conditions in the knowledge-based society, there is significant empirical evidence to suggest that the need for skilled labour in the field of ICTs is actually very limited and is concentrated in a small number of sectors directly involved in the production of ICTs (Ardenti and Vrain 2001; Beaujolin 1999, Vendramin and Valenduc 2000). Furthermore, this exclusive emphasis on ICTs when analysing employment trends and training needs should be severely condemned since it completely fails to reflect on what the role of education should be (education is seen as merely a tool for providing a skilled workforce, without even considering what sort of training is needed for those people who are not going to work with ICTs). 
^5	  This is a totalitarian discourse according to which work is an absolute imperative and is the only way in which a person can form part of society. Non-commercial work such as looking after one’s children or voluntary work is penalised: the only way in which one can contribute to society is by participating in the world of commercial work.
